A Human Situation Awareness Support System to Avoid Technological Disasters by Naderpour, M & Lu, J
B. Vitoriano et al. (eds.), Decision Aid Models for Disaster Management
and Emergencies, Atlantis Computational Intelligence Systems 7,
DOI: 10.2991/978-94-91216-74-9_14,  Atlantis Press 2013
Chapter 14
A Human Situation Awareness Support System
to Avoid Technological Disasters
Mohsen Naderpour and Jie Lu
Decision Systems & e-Service Intelligence Lab, Centre for Quantum Computation &
Intelligent Systems, School of Software, Faculty of Engineering and Information
Technology, University of Technology Sydney, PO Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007,
Australia
E-mail: Mohsen.Naderpour@student.uts.edu.au, Jie.Lu@uts.edu.au
In many complex technological systems, accidents have primarily been attributed to human
error. In the majority of these accidents the human operators were striving against signifi-
cant challenges. They have to face data overload, the challenge of working with a complex
system and the stressful task of understanding what is going on in the situation. There-
fore, to design and implement complex technological systems where the information flow
is quite high, and poor decisions may lead to serious consequences, Situation Awareness
(SA) should be appropriately considered. A level 1 SA is highly supported in these systems
through the various heterogeneous sensors and signal-processing methods but, for levels 2
and 3 there is still a need for concepts and methods. This work develops a system called the
Human Situation Awareness Support System (HSASS) that supports the safety operators
in an ever increasing amount of available risky status and alert information. The proposed
system includes a new dynamic situation assessment method based on risk, which has the
ability to support the operators’ understanding of the current state of the system, predict
the near future, and suggest appropriate actions. The proposed system does not control the
course of action and allows the human to act at his/her discretion in specific contexts.
14.1 Introduction
A technological disaster is an event caused by the failure of a technological system
and/or human error in controlling or handling the technology. Since the beginning of the
industrial revolution many serious large-scale technological systems’ accidents that had
grave consequences, such as those of Three Mile Island, Bhopal and Chernobyl, have pri-
marily been attributed to “operator error”. For instance, the release of methyl isocyanate
307
308 Decision Aid Models for Disaster Management and Emergencies
from the Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, India, in 1984 caused 2000 human ca-
sualties, 10,000 permanent disabilities, and over 200,000 injuries, arguably making it the
worst industrial disaster in history where the accident was officially blamed on human er-
ror [1]. Human error is the biggest challenge within most industries and on the surface,
would seem to imply that people are merely careless, poorly trained, or somehow not very
reliable. In fact, in the vast majority of these accidents the human operator was striving
against significant challenges. Operators have to face both data overload and the challenge
of working with a complex system. They are drilled with long lists of procedures and
checklists designed to cope with most of these difficulties, but from time to time they are
apt to fail. In fact, the person is not the cause of these errors but so much as the final dump-
ing ground for the inherent problems and difficulties in the technologies that engineers have
created [2]. Operators generally have no difficulty in physically performing their tasks, and
no difficulty in knowing what is the correct thing to do, but they are stressed by the task of
understanding what is going on in the situation. Over the last two decades, great deal of
research has been undertaken in the area of Situation Awareness (SA).
Today, in technological systems, operators rely on the principles and design of human
computer interaction to observe and comprehend the overwhelming amount of process data
that varies rapidly. They have often been moved to a control room far away from the phys-
ical process, so that their role becomes more of a monitor or supervisor of the automation
system, which is able to pass more and more information to the operator. It is widely ac-
cepted that more data does not equate to more information. In many cases automation has
only worsened the problem [3], and operators are required to handle more data and more
responsibility. For instance, in the 1970s, a typical operator manually controlled approxi-
mately 45 control valves in one process unit. Today, an operator controls, on average 175
control valves through an automation system interface. More specifically, the number of
observable process variables in the power distribution sector grew from 200,000 to 700,000
between the years 1990 and 2000 [4]. Although experienced users tend to filter through the
overabundance of data to generate information and acquire good SA, even the most expert
operator can become swamped by the excessive amount of data provided by new technolo-
gies. In the presence of all this data, operators are finding that they are even less aware than
ever before about the situations they are controlling. This has led to a huge gap between the
massive amount of data produced and disseminated and the operator’s ability to effectively
assimilate the required data and to make a timely, accurate decision [5].
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SA can be described as knowing and understanding what is going on around you and
predicting how things will change [6]. The problem of poor operator SA continues to
worsen as technology advances whether the operator is a pilot, a manufacturing operator,
or a manager, and it can be seen through automation-facilitated accidents throughout the
world. For example, on March 23, 2005, at Texas City, TX BP Amoco Refinery explosion,
15 workers were killed and 170 injured when a column was overfilled, overheated, and
over-pressurized on startup. A key problem identified in this catastrophic event was the
difficulty experienced by the operator in maintaining an accurate awareness of the situation
while monitoring a complex, fast moving environment [7]. Several other studies of accident
throughout many industries have found that loss of, or poor operator SA, was related to
accidents classified as human error. For instance, loss of SA has been associated with 88%
of major air carrier accidents that involved pilot errors and 58.6% of operational error in air
traffic control operations [8]. Due to the severity of the accidents that have occurred over
the last ten years, SA has become the focus of research that aims to understand operator
performance in critical, dynamic environments [9].
This research considers the applicability of SA concepts to safety in the control of
complex systems. Safety supervision continues to increase in degree of automation and
complexity as operators are decreasing. As a result, each safety operator must be able to
comprehend and respond to an ever increasing amount of available situations with risky
status and alert information. This study introduces a new system for SA enhancement
called the Human Situation Awareness Support System (HSASS).
This chapter presents the basic concepts of SA, the proposed HSASS system and how
it will be implemented, and looks at related areas of research for the future.
14.2 Basic Concepts and Related Works
14.2.1 Situation Awareness
One of the widely applicable SA definitions introduced by Endsley in 1995, describes
SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and
space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near
future” [10]. Endsley’s model is arranged into three hierarchical levels of SA, each stage
being a necessary precursor to the next higher level (Fig. 14.1). This model follows a chain
of information processing, from perception, through interpretation, to prediction. From the
lowest to the highest, the levels of SA are [11, 12]:
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• Perception: Perception involves the sensory detection of significant environmental
cues. For example, operators need to be able to see relevant displays or hear an alarm.
• Comprehension: Comprehension is understanding the meaning or significance of that
information in relation to goals. This process includes developing a comprehensive
picture of the world.
• Prediction: Projection consists of extrapolating information forward in time to deter-
mine how it will affect future states of the operating environment. The higher levels
of SA allow operators to function in a timely and effective manner, even with very
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Fig. 14.1 Situations Awareness in Dynamic Decision Making [10].
Endsley’s model has been used in a number of studies as a justification for structuring
the computer-supported SA process in a variety of complex positions, such as air traffic
controllers, nuclear power plant operations, anesthesiologists, military commanders, elec-
tronic warfare tacticians, automobile drivers, power plant operators, and so on [2, 5, 11, 13].
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14.2.2 Situation Assessment
SA is a state of knowledge that has to be distinguished from the processes underlying
the achievement of SA, which should be addressed as situation assessment [10]. The situ-
ation assessment models describe basic principles and general features about how people
process information or interact with the environment to attain their SA. In fact, awareness
information for a situation is derived as the results of situation assessment. Since SA is re-
garded as a dynamic and collaborative process, assessing a situation is often required data
integration or called data fusion with support of computer based intelligent techniques.
The enhancement of operators’ SA in complex systems is a major design goal in develop-
ing operator interfaces, automation concepts and training plans in a wide variety of fields
[14–16].
As SA aims to predict the status of a situation in the near future, which is the third level
of the SA model, we need proper and effective situation assessment approaches and tools
to conduct the prediction. For example many studies have reported that machine learning
techniques could be an effective method for intelligent prediction by extracting rules from
previous data to generate new assessment results [14], but their use has been limited, possi-
bly because of the lack of rich training data for this problem [17]. In some research, authors
developed a quantitative model based on Bayesian inference and information theory, and
described the process of knowledge-drivenmonitoring and the revision of operators’ under-
standing of the environments [15, 18]. Other studies considered computational methods,
but these approaches often do not satisfactorily handle all forms of uncertainty, especially
when information conflicts. Therefore, human behavior models have been developed from
cognitive architectures. The limitations of these systems are that they do not easily in-
corporate cognitive factors. Consequently, some approaches used the fuzzy logic system to
address the limitations of traditional models in producing the full range of human behaviors
[19–21].
14.2.3 Representing Situation Awareness
Endsley developed a methodology to determine the aspects of a situation that are im-
portant for a particular user’s SA requirements. This methodology is known as the Goal-
Directed Task Analysis (GDTA) and it is a specific form of cognitive task analysis that
focuses on identifying the goals and critical information needs for a task context. The
GDTA process has been used in many domains to detail SA requirements. As such, it
forms an exemplary template for incorporating human cognition into an actionable model
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by describing in detail not only a user’s information data needs (Level 1) , but also how that
information needs to be combined to form the comprehension (Level 2), and projection of
future events (Level 3) that are critical to SA, thereby providing a critical link between data
input and the decisions to be made in a goal-directed environment [22].
In this analysis, the major goals of a particular job class are identified, along with the
major sub-goals necessary for meeting each goal. Associated with each sub-goal, the major
decisions that need to be made are then identified. The SA needed for making these deci-
sions and carrying out each sub-goal are identified (Fig. 14.2). These requirements focus
not only on what data the operator needs, but also on how that information is integrated, or





















Fig. 14.2 Goal-Directed Task Analysis for Determining SA Requirements [10].
This type of analysis is based on goals or objectives, not tasks. This is because goals
form the basis for decision making in many complex environments. Conducting such an
analysis is usually carried out using a combination of cognitive engineering procedures
such as expert elicitation, observation of operator performance and analysis of documenta-
tion [2].
A Human Situation Awareness Support System to Avoid Technological Disasters 313
Table 14.1 Safety Goals and Decisions.
1.0 Eliminate or reduce the risks to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable








• Degree of losses
1.1.4 Level of Risk
• Current level
1.2 Reduce the risks
1.2.1 Establish the practical options
• Available reduction and containment options
1.2.2 Impact of the options
• New level of risk
14.3 A Human Situation Awareness Support System
14.3.1 A HSASS General Model
As discussed earlier, SA involves perceiving critical factors in the environment (SA
level 1), understanding what those factors mean, particularly when integrated together in
relation to the operator’s goals (SA level 2), and at the highest level, an understanding
of what will happen with the system in the near future (SA level 3) [2]. To determine the
features that are important for an operator’s SA, we use GDTA. The SA requirements focus
not only on what data the operator needs, but also on how that information is integrated or
combined to address each decision. In this analysis process, SA requirements are defined
as those dynamic information needs associated with the major goals, or subgoals of, the
operator to perform his/her job. The results are showed in Table 14.1 [23].
The information provided for situational awareness must be more than just information
gathering. This implies collecting the right multi-domain information across a net-centric
environment for shared awareness and presenting the results for the human to understand
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and make quick decisions. Any new approach must efficiently bring together the human
operator, sensor equipment data, and real world events to provide a subset of actionable
information [17]. Fig. 14.3 shows the general model of HSASS.
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Fig. 14.3 The HSASS General Model.
14.3.2 Information Fusion and Hazard Identification Component
Critical factors in the environment (SA level 1) should be collected from various sen-
sors, which are distributed in an intended area. This aims to locate and identify objects, and
also provide a global picture of the situation, which is reported by fusing the attributes of an
object from multiple sources. Any variety of relations - physical, organizational, informa-
tional, and perceptual - can be considered, as appropriate to the given information system’s
mission. Knowledge and experience of the past can be applied to the determination of the
potential hazardous circumstances. The outcome of this step is identification of hazardous
entities or relations that have a potential to lead to loss. As can be seen from the Fig. 14.3,
this forms what we defined as the information fusion and hazard identification component.
14.3.3 Situation Assessment Component
SA level 2 relates to the operator’s understanding of the system as a whole, and emer-
gent events (such as alarms or casualties), that arise from hazardous situations. Therefore it
is necessary to understand the causality of the current situation. SA level 3 requires that the
system and operator should understand the future state so consequences of the current sit-
uation should be determined; depending on the consequent losses, the current hazards may
subsequently require risk elimination, mitigation, transfer, control or combination thereof,
so it is necessary to assist the operators to choose the appropriate actions.
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Based on above mentioned points, the situation assessment component involves causal,
consequence and option analysis. The causal analysis techniques are predominately ap-
plied within reliability engineering and are generally supported by mathematical founda-
tions and a suite of computer based tools. The quantification of causal models entails an
objective assessment of the potential frequency or likelihood for the causal factors. These
are combined according to the rules of probability calculus and Boolean logic to generate a
normalized or absolute measure for the realization of existing hazards. Consequence anal-
ysis is concerned with what may potentially follow the occurrence of a hazardous situation.
Adverse outcomes associated with the current hazardous situation should be considered,
including various degrees of harm to people, commercial detriment to an enterprise, dam-
age to the ecology of the environment, or a combination of these factors. It is useful for all
three components to be converted and expressed in a common currency, such as money, for
potential comparison and aggregation in order to provide a coherent view of the totality of
loss associated with a hazardous situation. Options analysis provides the future necessary
actions that should be implemented to eliminate or reduce the risks. On identification and
recording, it is essential to estimate the likely effects and potential benefits of each option
on the consequent safety, commercial and environmental losses, in order to establish the
objective and systematic criteria for selection and implementation. This is a requirement
of the statutory legal framework in some countries (e.g. the UK) to ensure that the safety
risks are reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels.
14.4 HSASS Implementation
14.4.1 Environment Description
To illustrate how to implement the HSASS into a real world environment, we use the
example of a petrochemical plant with expert systems as artificial intelligence tools. An
ethylbenzene process plant, involving two reactors and two distillation columns, as shown
in Fig. 14.4, is chosen.
An exothermic reaction occurs in Reactor 1 (R1) at 160 ◦C and 9 bar, in which benzene
(B) and ethylene (E) react to produce ethylbenzene (EB). The undesirable reaction of ethy-
lene and ethylbenzene to produce higher-order species, for example, diethylbenzene (DEB)
is suppressed by the large excess of benzene in R1. Any DEB produced is separated from
ethylbenzene and recycled to R2, which operates adiabatically as DEB reacts with benzene
to produce ethylbenzene. Benzene, in the D1 distillate, is recycled to R1. A mixture of EB
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Fig. 14.4 Process Flow Sheet of Ethylbenzene Process.
and DEB in the D1 bottoms product is fed to D2, with EB recovered in the distillate, and
DEB recycled to R2 [12].
Chemical processes are characterized by many variables that allow representation of
the behaviour, using a set of rules. These factors allow us to use them appropriately for SA.
We use three types of rules: fact, intermediate and decision rules. The format of the rule is
as follows:
IF Antecedent; THEN Consequent
Inference direction can be generally divided into three types: (1) backward reasoning:
starts with the target, intending to prove the target to be true or false; (2) forward reason-
ing: starts from the fact, reasoning towards target; (3) mixed reasoning: reasoning in both
directions. In our work, the forward reasoning strategy is used.
14.4.2 Hazard Identification Implementation
Hazards are often obtained through the design and implementation phase, and various
models have been developed to identify them. For example, HAZOP is one of the most
powerful hazard identification methods available and has been clearly described in the re-
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Table 14.2 Temperature Limits (◦C).
Unit Operating value Six-sigma quality High alarm Automatic shutdown
R1 160 165 170 180
R2 166 170 175 185
D1 186 190 195 200
D2 200 205 210 220
search literature [30]. Fault tree, event tree, bow-tie and experts’ knowledge are adopted as
the knowledge acquisition techniques.
To show and store the hazardous situations we use fact rules. In a fact rule, ‘antecedent’
refers to conditions that have potential to harm, while ‘consequent’ is a name for the current
situation. For example:
IF TCR1 > 170 ◦C; THEN the temperature of R1 is high
For the ethylbenzene process, hazardous situations include those due to controller fail-
ure, loss of cooling, disturbances in the feed temperatures and flow rates, the reboiler heat
duty, and flooding in the distillation columns. The safety systems are assigned temperature
limits, as shown in Table 14.2, including limits for the six-sigma quality (by definition,
when the controller fails to maintain the temperature within the six-sigma quality limit, the
controller “Fails”), high alarm and automatic shut-down. For each abnormal event, when
these limits are exceeded, time logs for the safety systems are recorded [12]. For example
Fig. 14.5 shows a bow-tie diagram for a high-temperature abnormal event associated with
reactor R1. The consequences include continued-operation (CO), shut-down (SD), release
(REL), and explosion (EXP), based on the performance of six safety systems shown in
rectangles across the left. The six safety systems are: S1 (high alarm), S2 (operator obser-
vation), S3 (operator correction), S4 (automatic shut-down), S5 (manual shut-down), and
S6 (emergency relief system).































Fig. 14.5 Bow-tie Diagram for High Temperature in R1.
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14.4.3 Situation Assessment Implementation
The situation assessment component will provide the comprehension and projection
levels of the SA. To support these levels, we use intermediate rules. In an intermediate rule,
‘antecedent’ is a situation, while ‘consequent’ is a description of causes and consequences.
14.4.3.1 Likelihood Determination
To determine the likelihood of a target event, the concept of physical reliability models
can be used. Reliability models aim to explain the reliability (or failure) of a component
as a multivariate function of operational physical parameters. Among different types of
physical reliability models, covariate models and static models can be used to estimate the
primary events and consequently the probability of the target event [24].
Operational physical parameters, also called covariates, may be temperature, velocity,
pressure, or vibration amplitude. Covariate models explain the failure rate of a component
as a function e.g.:






where any change in covariate xi will change the failure probability F(t). Static models do
not consider time as an influential parameter and only consider the component’s strength
and stresses. Both stress and strength can be constant or considered as random variables
having probability distribution functions. For example, the failure probability of compo-
nent Q having a constant strength, k, and being under a random stress, Y , can be defined as
the probability of Y being greater than k, e.g.:




where fY (y) is the probability density function (PDF) of stress, Y . Assuming an exponential




λ e−λ ydy= e−λ k
Therefore the failure probability of component Q can be reassessed when a new value
for k is observed.
k
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14.4.3.2 Consequence Determination
Generally, consequences of an abnormal situation may be categorized into four groups;
asset loss, human fatality, environmental loss, and confidence or reputation loss. The sever-
ity matrix used in this study is outlined in Table 14.3 including equivalent dollar value of
damage associated with each consequence category based on the severity of damage [25].
The failure probability of each safety system can be determined by the probabilistic
method and end states are determined by multiplying the related probabilities together.
Previous probabilities are called “Priors”, representing our belief about the system be-
fore observing the new data. After the initiation of the process, accident precursor data
which are the near misses and incidents occurring in the process (defined as events that are
not characterized as accidents but indicate the increasing likelihood of an accident occur-
rence) can be collected from the system. The ASP data can be used to form the likelihood
function, which in turn updates the prior knowledge about the occurrence probability of
every end state resulting in the formation of the posterior function. Bayesian theory is a
probabilistic approach that applies the conditional probability principals to reason with un-
certainties. The results obtained by application of this theory in this study will yield the
“Posterior” which is the updated knowledge about the end states of the system. Considering
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Table 14.4 Risk Matrix.
S.
P. Very little Little Medium High Very high
Very likely Significant Significant High High High
Likely Medium Significant Significant High High
Even Low Medium Significant High High
Unlikely Low Low Medium Significant High
Very Unlikely Low Low Medium Significant Significant
x as the failure probability of the system and f (x)as the probability distribution function
(prior distribution), f (xData) will present the posterior distribution that is derived using
the following equation:
f (x | Data) ∝ g(Data | x) f (x)
where f (x | Data)is the posterior function, g(Data | x) is the likelihood function and f (x)
is the prior [26].
14.4.3.3 Current Risk Level
To obtain the risk level of the target hazard we use a fuzzy risk analysis model. We
present probability of hazards with five linguistic values, e.g. very likely, likely, even, un-
likely, and very unlikely, and will explain the severity by five linguistic values e.g. very
little, little, medium, high and very high. The risks are represented by low, medium, sig-
nificant and high. Triangular and trapezium membership functions can be used together to
increase the sensitivity in some bound points. Fig. 14.6 shows membership functions for
probability, severity and risk variables.
To construct the fuzzy risk analysis model, we considered the risk matrix as shown in
Table 14.4, which has 25 rules, e.g.:
IF the probability is likely AND the severity is medium
THEN the risk is high
14.4.3.4 Risk Reduction
If the estimated risk is unacceptable, it is necessary to identify risk-reducing measures
that reduce either the frequency or the consequences of the occurrence of the unwanted
event. For each individually considered risk element, a decision must be made whether or
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not the investment in the risk-reducingmeasures has the effect of reducing the risk to an ac-
ceptable level [33]. A list of available reduction and containment options can be presented
as decision rules where ‘antecedent’ is a situation, while ‘consequent’ is suggested actions
to remove or eliminate the risk. Based on the operator’s decision, a new level of risk can
be calculated.
Fig. 14.6 Membership Functions.
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Table 14.5 Examples of Knowledge Rules.
Rule 1 IF TR1 > 170◦C Fact
THEN Hazard (H1R1) : high temperature in R1
Rule 2 IF TR2 > 175◦C Fact
THEN Hazard (H1R2) : high temperature in R2
Rule 3 IF TD1 > 195◦C Fact
THEN Hazard (H1D1): high temperature in D1
Rule 4 IF TD2 > 210◦C Fact
THEN Hazard (H1D2): high temperature in D2
. . .
Rule 21 IF (H1R1) Intermediate
THEN Poor cooling or TCR1 fail or input low level
Rule 22 IF (H1R2)
THEN . . .
. . .
Rule 40 IF (H1R1) Decision
THEN switch to redundancy pump in cooling system and administrative checks
. . .
Assume the temperature in Reactor1 is increased to 170 ◦C. The system is initialized
an abnormal situation occurred; the results are sent to the inference machine and stored in
the integrated database. Rule 1 is selected and returned according to the knowledge rules.
The system reports that the hazard (H1R1) occurred and an alarm will be shown on the
operator’s interface. At the same time, H1R1 characteristics are recalled from the database.
The posterior probability is calculated using Bayesian inference. For this example the
abnormal event occurred at interval 20 and the posterior probability is 0.0132. Accord-
ing to the fuzzy risk analysis model the current risk level is 0.65 and the system presents
“significant” risk level on the GUI. The causes of hazardous situation are searched by the
inference machine and Rule 21 is written to the cause’s area of GUI, and Rule 40 is se-
lected. The operating suggestions are displayed in the monitoring windows of the system.
Usually, during a short time period when multiple alarms occur, it is not possible to remove
all of them. One has to attribute priorities, and our approach has this ability.
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14.5 Conclusion and Future Study
During the operation of complex systems that include human decision making, ac-
quiring and interpreting information from the environment forms the basis for the state of
knowledge of a decision maker. This state is often referred to as situation awareness (SA).
Lacking or inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents
attributed to human error and it is especially important in work domains where the infor-
mation flow can be quite high, and poor decisions may lead to serious consequences. As
technological systems continue to increase in degree of automation and complexity, the task
of providing actionable information for SA becomes more difficult and costly to achieve.
In this study we proposed a new system to support SA for the safety operators. Initially, our
system conducts the complicated task of understanding what is going on in the situation,
and it then assesses the current situation by the risk analysis concept through a case study.
The enhancement of SA is a major design goal for developers of operator interfaces,
automation concepts, and training programs in a verity of fields. To evaluate the degree to
which new technologies or design concepts actually improve operator SA, it is necessary to
systematically evaluate them based on a measure of SA, which can determine those ideas
that have merit and those that have unforeseen negative consequences [8]. Therefore, de-
veloping a SA measuring method and a system prototype evaluation based on the proposed
SA measurement will form the basis for future study in this work.
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